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Nick Sitter (Sandvika)
Euro-Scepticism as Party Strategy:
Persistence and Change in Party-Based
Opposition to European Integration
Parteien, die eine grundsätzlich oder bedingt ablehnende Haltung der europäischen Integration
gegenüber vertreten, sind im gesamten politischen Spektrum zu finden. Ein kursorischer Blick auf die
europäische Parteienlandschaft zeigt, dass Mitte-Links- und Mitte-Rechts-Parteien eher nicht zur
Übernahme einer grundsätzlich euro-skeptischen Position tendieren, obwohl sie bestimmte Aspekte
der europäischen Integration ablehnen mögen, wenn diese programmatischen Zielen zuwiderlaufen.
Bis auf einige bedeutende Ausnahmen beschränkt sich die prinzipielle Ablehnung auf Parteien an den
Rändern des politischen Spektrums bzw. auf Parteien, die spezifische Interessen und Identitäten re-
präsentieren. Basierend auf der Annahme, dass die Entscheidung einer Partei für die Annahme einer
europa-skeptischen Haltung bzw. deren Modifikation eine strategische ist, untersucht der Beitrag die
Wurzeln für den Euroskeptizismus der Partien und die Dynamiken seiner Unveränderlichkeit bzw.
seines Wandels. Die Parteistrategie ist untrennbar mit der Position der Partei im jeweiligen Parteien-
system verbunden und wird von der Abwägung der folgenden vier, das Wesen einer politischen Partei
bestimmende Ziele bestimmt: dem organisatorischen Überleben, der Umsetzung spezifischer pro-
grammatischer Ziele (policies), der Stimmenmaximierung (votes) und der Ausübung von Regierungs-
gewalt (office). Obwohl viele, wenn nicht sogar fast alle Parteien Strategien der sog. Catch-all-
Parteien oder Kartellparteien verfolgen, hat doch eine beachtliche Anzahl an Parteien alternative
oder gemischte Strategien gewählt. Die euro-skeptischen Tendenzen der Parteien und die Anreize für
eine solche ablehnende Haltung werden mit diesen unterschiedlichen Strategien in Zusammenhang
gebracht und analysiert. Folgenden Fragen wird nachgegangen: Warum übernehmen Parteien euro-
skeptische Positionen und warum verändern sie diese? Die Zähmung der Widerspenstigen oder
die Abschwächung des Euroskeptizismus kann über Veränderungen in der Gewichtung der vier Ziele
oder den Rahmenbedingungen erfolgen oder über eine Kombination aus beiden.
1. Introduction
Parties across the political spectrum in both
West and East Central Europe have adopted
stances opposed to or critical of their countrys
participation in European integration. Most
party systems have, at one point or another, fea-
tured at least one such party. The sheer diver-
sity of Euro-scepticism in terms of contents,
intensity and location in the party systems sug-
gests that it might not be particularly useful to
approach it as a single phenomenon. Although
the question of whether to join the European
Economic Community/European Union (here-
after EU) might be seen as dichotomous, oppo-
sition to participation in European integration
ranges from absolute rejection to scepticism
about particular initiatives. Euro-scepticism
entails opposition to something specific, but
there is considerable variety in the bases for this
opposition. This diversity suggests that Euro-
scepticism is not a single issue, let alone a clea-
vage, and this is reinforced by its occurrence
across several policy dimensions (Taggart/
Szczerbiak 2001; Sitter 2001). Perhaps the most
useful distinction, particularly with respect to
the dynamics of change, is between opposition
to European integration in principle and more
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contingent opposition linked to specific inter-
ests. Szczerbiak/Taggarts (2000) hard and
soft labels are now widely used to capture this
distinction. Although even this still allows for
shades of blue (Batory 2002), it provides a
rough classification and aids identification of
changes in parties Euro-scepticism. In these
terms, the taming of the shrew is a matter of
softening Euro-scepticism, as parties shift from
principled to contingent opposition or its inten-
sity is reduced. A small number of parties have
even abandoned Euro-scepticism altogether. In
what follows, these dynamics are explored in
terms of party strategy.
Euro-scepticism may be thought of as an
empty box, into which a broad range of policy
positions can be put. Yet the box is not com-
pletely empty, and it does not exist in a vacuum.
First, Euro-scepticism is elaborated as opposi-
tion to a specific project. When EU policy is
opposed on the grounds that there is too much
or too little regulation/redistribution/interven-
tion in any given area, the policy content of
Euro-scepticism is cast in opposition to exist-
ing (or proposed) policy. Second, most Euro-
scepticism is expressed in terms of policy not
only at the EU level but also at the national level.
Opposition is usually linked to a preferable do-
mestic alternative. Each EU policy has a range
of domestic policy alleles (to borrow a term
from biology, which denotes possible alterna-
tives to a specific gene), one of which Euro-
sceptic parties subscribe to for any given policy
debate. A degree of consistency across these
policy alleles within a party is usually sought,
and Euro-scepticism is therefore shaped by a
partys position on related policies. Third, party
platforms are usually designed with reference
to the partys domestic competitors, and incen-
tives to contest European integration therefore
depend on other competitors strategies. The
only common basis that most Euro-sceptic par-
ties share is nationalism, at least in the sense
defined by Gellner (1983): a political doctrine
that holds that the world is divided into nations
and that national and political units should be
congruent. However, like Euro-scepticism, na-
tionalism says little about policy (Schopflin
1995). In short, although Euro-scepticism can
accommodate a wide range of policies, party-
based Euro-scepticism is shaped by the party
system. If the question concerns the taming of
the shrew, the starting point is that there is no
single united shrew but many shrews of very
different characters. And any taming of the
shrew is part of the national party system dy-
namic.
The central question concerns the conditions
under which parties come to oppose participa-
tion in European integration and how this op-
position is softened (or hardened). Approach-
ing this from a (rational) actors perspective, the
elaboration and modification of stances on Eu-
ropean integration is considered a matter of party
strategy. If (drawing on Sartori 1976; Strøm
1990a; Pennings 1998) parties are defined as
organisations that seek to propel candidates to
elected office in pursuit of certain policy aims,
then the party leadership faces four goals which
often entail some kind of trade-off: i) the sur-
vival of the party; ii) the pursuit of its preferred
policy outcomes; iii) the pursuit of votes; and
iv) the quest for executive office. The first sec-
tion, below, outlines three broad strategies that
constitute responses to these challenges. The
first one is associated with the catch-all model
of political parties, while the other two are al-
ternatives. The subsequent four sections each
address one of the four goals, relating these to
incentives for Euro-scepticism. The empirical
evidence is drawn predominantly from second-
ary sources, published country-specific analy-
ses, with a view to capturing the key cases and
full variation in the EU member, quasi-member
and prospective member states.
2.Party Strategy  Three Patterns of
Opposition in Europe
Although broad trends in party organisation,
electoral competition and policy have been ob-
served in Europe over time, this should not ob-
scure the fact that distinct types of party strat-
egy persist. The extent to which parties adapt
and change depends on their organisation and
preferences, and on how they interpret chal-
lenges, almost as much as on the actual chal-
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lenges. Some are more immune to contagion
from their competitors than others. Whereas
most of the large centre-right and -left parties
have faced strong incentives to adapt to their
competitors organisational and strategic
changes, whether in the form of contagion from
the left in the shape of successful social demo-
crat parties (Duverger 1954) or the catch-all
parties on the centre-right (Kirchheimer 1966;
Epstein 1967), others have proven more resist-
ant. Katz/Mair (1995, 2002) find that many
catch-all parties are becoming more modern
cartel parties, but point out that these parties
face challenges by for example protest parties
(Wolinetz 2002). Across Western Europe many
parties have found the catch-all model difficult
to imitate, or rejected this model. This applies
to communists (Bosco 2000) and greens
(Richardson/Rootes 1995) on the left, agrarian
(Arter 2001) and denominational parties
(Hanley 1994) in the centre, and new populist
parties on the right (Taggart 1995). Compara-
ble strategies have been attempted, with vary-
ing degrees of success, in post-communist East
Central Europe (Sitter 2002a). These alterna-
tives are a matter of strategy rather than party
organisation. Even if, over time, most parties
may employ more full time professional party
officials, rely more on public funding and less
on activist mass memberships, or use the media
and pollsters more extensively, it does not nec-
essarily follow that they abandon their strate-
gies of interest representation or protest. In other
words, even if party organisations and tactics
converge, strategies for competition remain dif-
ferent if some parties decide not to attempt to
catch all of the electorate.
2.1. Party Goals and Party Strategy
The strategic decision whether to maximise
votes by appealing to the entire electorate (the
catch-all strategy), to seek to represent the in-
terests of a specific part of the electorate (inter-
est representation), or capture general protest
against the mainstream consensus (protest), is
the product of parties preferences in terms of
their goals  survival, policy, votes, office. Pur-
suit of office, and therefore votes, is defined as
the aim of political parties in classic rational
choice analyses (Downs 1957; Riker 1962;
Axelrod 1970). This has been supplemented by
focus on parties pursuit of policy, which shapes
both their coalition games and their pursuit of
votes (de Swaan 1973; Budge/Laver 1986;
Dunleavy 1991). Moreover, policy goals may
be achieved without formal participation in coa-
litions and formal participation may actually
entail costs in terms of association with unpopu-
lar policies (Laver/Schofield 1990; Strøm
1990b; Laver/Shepsle 1996). The pursuit of
votes, policy and office are thus linked, but
maximising one may require merely sacrificing
one of the others (Müller/Strøm 1999). To com-
plicate this relationship further, a fourth goal 
survival of the party  may be inferred by draw-
ing on the literature on party organisation
(Panebianco 1988). The party leadership is con-
strained by the rest of the party, the activists in
particular, and the need to maintain a minimum
degree of consistency with respect to the par-
tys identity and core values. In the light of the
divisive impact the EU question has had on
many Scandinavian and British parties, this last
point is far from trivial (Saglie 2000; Baker
2003). This is linked to the partys raison dêtre,
its core identity and principles, particularly in
the case of parties that have their roots in pro-
test against or opposition to other parties
(Mathieu 1999). These fours goals are set out
in figure 1.
Party strategy is therefore defined as the par-
tys overall, more or less coherent, approach to
these four goals. Taking a leaf out of the disci-
Figure 1: Party goals and strategy
Coalition Politics
!
Party Party Electoral
Organisation "    Strategy    # Appeal
$
Policy Goals
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plines of military and business studies, strategy
may be defined as the link between goals and
their achievement (Von Clausewitz 1832) or,
paraphrasing Porter (1980/1998, xxiv), as a
broad formula for how a party is going to com-
pete  a combination of what its ends should be
and by which means these should be pursued.
Each goal is potentially contentious. First, se-
curing support from and maintaining the unity
of the party organisation involves questions
about the partys identity, ideology, internal or-
ganisation and links to external organisations.
A party may remain committed to its original
goals, or outgrow them over time as they are
achieved or lose salience. It may accord con-
siderable weight to ideology  a given frame-
work for analysing issues  or downplay it, or
even move toward ideological pluralism. Inter-
nal organisation, particularly organised factions,
affects the leaderships freedom of action. The
same holds for links with external organisations,
from interest groups and trade unions to
churches or grassroots movements. Second,
policy pursuit and interest representation entails
not only balancing and prioritising different and
sometimes conflicting policy goals, but also
aligning new policy positions with existing plat-
forms. Third, electoral appeal often involves a
trade-off between broad catch-all appeal and
appeal to a core constituency, or between cen-
tripetal competition centred on the median voter
and centrifugal campaigns that strengthen a par-
tys profile. Fourth, coalition games by defini-
tion involve compromise with competitors.
Drawing on the West European experience,
three broad sets of party strategies are identi-
fied. The first is linked to the catch-all and car-
tel models of party organisation, while the sec-
ond and third represent alternative strategies for
competition.
2.2. Party Strategy and Patterns of
Opposition
Although some of the attributes of the cartel
and catch-all party ideal types can be found in
most parties, these models are linked to a par-
ticular, dominant, form of party. In Kirch-
heimers and Katzs/Mairs analyses the dy-
namic process that leads toward the catch-all
and cartel model is one in which the major par-
ties respond to and imitate each others success-
ful innovations. The old, candidate-driven elite
parties were challenged by well-organised so-
cialist mass parties that drew on trade unions,
mass membership and class-oriented ideology.
The response involved not only contagion in
terms of organisation and campaigns, but also
an effort to defeat the class appeal by invoking
a wider catch-all appeal targeting the entire elec-
torate. Coupled with increasingly independent
party elites, the role of the media and focus on
salient issues rather than divisive ideologies, the
result is the catch-all ideal type. This entails a
shift toward more professionalised parties, more
independent of external organisations, which
focus on competence and managerial skills as
much as issues, and employ public relations-
style campaigns. It is associated with a shift in
the partys income, from membership dues to
state subsidies and a wider range of contribu-
tions. Whereas the mass party represents soci-
ety to the state, the catch-all party is a link be-
tween the two; the cartel party comes closer to
representing the state to society. The catch-all
strategy thus entails maximising votes and
prioritising the pursuit of office, while playing
down ideology and policy commitments and to
some extent marginalising party activists in fa-
vour of professionals. This process of organisa-
tional and strategic adaptation is driven by the
main parties competition with each other, and
shapes the left vs. right (or at least the central)
dimension in a party system. This is the first
and main pattern of opposition: left vs. right. In
most of Western Europe, social democrats came
to define the left, while conservatives and lib-
erals struggled (sometimes inconclusively) to
constitute the right. A similar process has oc-
curred in East Central Europe after 1989, but
yielded outcomes that sometimes make the use
of left and right in the conventional West
European sense somewhat problematic.
However, a number of parties eschewed the
catch-all strategy in favour of retaining focus
on a section of the electorate, often reflecting
cleavages other than the owner vs. workers
243
division, notably what Lipset/Rokkan (1967)
cast as state vs. church, centre vs. periphery and
rural vs. urban interests. Parties face a funda-
mental choice whether they seek to shape the
main dimension of the party system and com-
pete primarily along this left vs. right dimen-
sion, or to circumvent it. Several parties have
chosen the latter, mobilising voters along cross-
cutting cleavages or policy dimensions. West-
ern Europe features several parties that repre-
sent specific ethnic or cultural minorities, eco-
nomic interests and/or champion regional au-
tonomy, captured in the term territorial poli-
tics (Rokkan/Urwin 1983). Although these par-
ties have chosen to compete across the left vs.
right dimension, they have perforce staked out
positions along this dimension. Electoral com-
petition and coalition games make such align-
ment obligatory, and most agrarian, religious and
regional parties have aligned themselves be-
tween the social democrat left and liberal/con-
servative right. The second pattern of opposi-
tion is therefore competition across the left vs.
right axis, focussing on the interests of a spe-
cific constituency. In most of these parties the
organisation tends to retain stronger power over
the leadership than in the catch-all model, be-
cause they are organised around a stricter set of
interests or identities. Ideology, or commitment
to the partys original aim, is likely to be impor-
tant. Consequently, other things being equal,
policy goals are likely to outweigh vote-
maximisation or the quest for office.
A third set is made up of parties that attempt
to circumvent left vs. right competition by com-
peting on the flanks of the party system or in
protest against its core consensus. The commu-
nist and fascist anti-systems parties that emerged
across Europe in the wake of the First World
War made up the extreme anti-system variety.
Their counterparts after the Second World War
may in some cases have toned down the anti-
system stance, but were largely eschewed by the
mainstream parties. In the 1970s some were
crowded out by new populist parties in the shape
of anti-tax protest parties on the right and new
socialist, radical and green parties on the left.
This constitutes the third pattern of opposition,
at the flanks of the system. If anything, these
parties often take the cartel partys organisational
features to the extreme as far as leadership domi-
nance, populist appeal and innovative cam-
paigning is concerned, although some new left
parties feature flatter organisation and stronger
ideology than their mainstream social democrat
rivals. They have tended to be excluded from
coalition games, although this may be chang-
ing. Far right parties have participated in gov-
ernment in Italy, Austria and the Netherlands,
and support minority centre-right coalitions in
Denmark and Norway.
Finally, a number of parties have adopted
mixed strategies. Several new populist parties
have made concerted efforts to establish them-
selves as more mainstream parties (Harmel/
Svasand 1997). Forza Italia, which was
launched in the run-up to the 1994 election,
epitomises the transformation from new popu-
list party to mainstream centre-right party (Do-
novan 1994). Mečiars Movement for a Demo-
cratic Slovakia achieved something similar, de-
fining one pole of the government vs. opposi-
tion dimension in Slovakia (Sitter 2002b). Oth-
ers have moved partially toward catch-all strat-
egies, as when the Norwegian, Swedish and
Finnish agrarian parties changed names to Cen-
tre parties between 1957 and 1965, broadening
their original agrarian focus to rural or regional
interests (Arter 1999, 2001).
2.3. Party Strategy and Euro-Scepticism
For most political parties Euro-scepticism 
the elaboration of a platform opposed to par-
ticipation in (aspects of) European integration
 has been a deliberate and explicitly consid-
ered choice (see country cases in Taggart/
Szczerbiak, forthcoming). This may be consid-
ered a question of party strategy, and as such
linked to the three types of strategy above. Ex-
trapolating from Euro-scepticism in Scandina-
via (Sitter 2001): The catch-all strategy is hardly
compatible with hard Euro-scepticism, partly
because hard opposition to the EU is associated
with strong ideological commitment and partly
because the integration process has been a gov-
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ernment-driven process. However, parties that
find themselves considerably to the left or right
of the European consensus may face greater in-
centives to adopt Euro-sceptic stances. This has
been linked to the development of EU economic
policy (Marks/Wilson 2000), but is also associ-
ated with being out of office. By contrast, the
interest-oriented and protest strategies lend
themselves more easily to alignment against
European integration, inasmuch as protest at the
domestic and EU level can be mutually rein-
forcing (Taggart 1998), and specific interest
such as protection of agriculture is not always
compatible with participation in European inte-
gration (Batory/Sitter forthcoming).
Inasmuch as European parties operate in a
multi-level party system (Deschouwer 2000),
they are under pressure to adapt to changing
institutional parameters and policies at both
domestic and EU level. The two long term goals
 related to party organisation and policy pref-
erences  are more likely to be affected by sub-
stantial developments such as discrepancies
between ideology or policy at the two levels than
by institutional pressure. If a partys core val-
ues are incompatible with supranational govern-
ance or its ideology and policy preferences jar
with those of the EU, there is a substantive base
for Euro-scepticism (figure 3a). On the other
hand, the more immediate concerns of maxim-
ising votes and winning office are more sensi-
tive to institutional pressure, and may provide
incentives for a party to soften Euro-scepticism
(figure 3b). The partys position relative to its
target electorate depends on a mixture of the two
types of pressure. If opposition to European in-
tegration is linked to policy or ideological com-
Figure 2: Parties and strategy
Protest: Catch-all: Interests:
Competing at the flanks Defining left vs. right Cross-cutting left vs. right
 1880 Elite party
 1880  Mass party
 1919  Anti-system party Interest party
 1945  Catch-all party
 1970  Protest and new Cartel party Single issue party
populist parties
mitment, it is more likely to be located at one
(or both) wings of any particular policy dimen-
sion than at the centre. Euro-sceptic appeal
might therefore limit a partys appeal to neu-
tral voters. Yet the questions salience varies
partly with the links between the domestic and
EU level (timing of elections, treaties, referen-
dums etc.). Participation in coalition govern-
ments that are party to EU deals may involve
considerable costs for Euro-sceptic parties.
Given that the strategies of cross-cutting and
flanking opposition entail at least partial rejec-
tion of the catch-all strategy, these dynamics
cannot be expected to play out the same way
across the three strategies.
3.Party Identity and Organisation  the
Corner Stone of Opposition to European
Integration
The first of political parties four goals  sur-
vival of the organisation  warrants focus on
the partys origins and long-tern evolution as
well as its organisation and links with extra-par-
liamentary organisations. These factors lie at the
core of Panebiancos (1988) analysis of party
organisation and power. The genesis of parties,
in terms of how they emerge as central organi-
sations that diffuse throughout the polity or pe-
ripheral organisations that penetrate the core,
and their links with external sponsoring organi-
sations, allows for distinctions within and across
party families. Focus on the origins of parties
helps prevent problematic classifications of for
example the Scandinavian protestant Christian
parties as continental-style Christian democrats.
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Although parties can and do change, and may
transcend their original aims and organisation,
a degree of continuity characterises most par-
ties. Parties identities therefore tend to shape
debates on how they should respond to new
questions such as European integration.
In the light of the three main ideological
strands that have given rise to broad centre-left
and -right parties it is hardly surprising that
Euro-scepticism is the exception rather than the
rule. Nationalism sits uneasily with both socialist
and liberal ideology (Schopflin 1993, 1995).
Even if liberals have at times allied with nation-
alists, their primary focus on the individual
rather than community renders such marriages
fragile. Something similar holds for socialisms
primary focus on class, even if some socialist
parties have seen free market European integra-
tion as a threat. In both cases Euro-scepticism
is contingent. On the centre-right, Catholic
Christian democracys acceptance of the
supranational church and its doctrine of
subsidiarity meant that multi-layered authority
and the principles behind European integration
were familiar (Wilke/Wallace 1990). Even free
market conservatives, particularly in Scandina-
via, usually find supranational arrangements an
Figure 3A: Long term goals and incentives for Euro-scepticism
The partys origin and identity,
Core policy preferences
in terms of salience to members
Compatible with supranational Focus on national
governance and participatory democracy
Core policy preferences
compatible with EU No Euro-scepticism Soft Euro-scepticism
membership
Core policy preferences
incompatible with EU Soft Euro-scepticism Hard Euro-scepticism
membership
Figure 3B: Shorter term goals and incentives faced by Euro-sceptic parties
Coalition government
Vote-seeking
Pro-EU electorate Anti-EU electorate
Coalition politics exerts Abandon Euro-scepticism Soften Euro-scepticism
moderating effect
Coalition politics exerts Soften Euro-scepticism Harden Euro-scepticism
little moderating effect
acceptable price for free trade, though the Brit-
ish and Czech cases suggest that this varies with
policy (Hanley 1999). Only more protectionist
or traditionalist strands of conservatism, some
of which emerged as significant in post-com-
munist East Central Europe, are difficult to rec-
oncile with European integration in principle.
In Western Europe the major parties as a rule
played down ideology as they adopted catch-
all strategies. Much the same holds for the so-
cial democrat and reform communist parties in
East Central Europe. The centre-right is how-
ever divided between parties that sought to in-
voke a return to the West and those that in-
voked the inter-war historical legacy (Sitter
2002b). The latter, and those that model them-
selves on British Thatcherites, are more prone
to Euro-scepticism.
The second factor related to parties origins
and structures is internal organisation. Herein
lies the key to the catch-all parties potential for
Euro-scepticism. By adopting broad church
strategies that welcome a range of interests and
degrees of ideological commitment, both social-
ist and conservative parties allow for more or
less nationalist factions. To the extent that these
factions are associated with protectionist inter-
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ests, or more traditionalist nation-oriented val-
ues, they have much in common with territorial
interest parties. In the British, German and
French party systems the currents that may be
considered the equivalent of the territorial op-
position in Scandinavia have remained within
the mainstream parties, albeit often at the mar-
gins. The challenge for catch-all parties is how
to handle internal dissent on the European ques-
tion.
The third element that may shape parties
broad pro- or anti-European commitment is ex-
ternal organisations that sponsor the party. Al-
though the catch-all model entails a decline in
extra-parliamentary organisations influence,
protectionist trade unions have strengthened
Euro-sceptic strands within social democrat
parties in cases where the EU is perceived as
more free-market-oriented than the state
(Ashford 1992; Ryden 2000; Saglie 2000). In
post-communist East Central Europe there has
been some scope for protectionism on the cen-
tre-right as well, from churches as well as from
the trade union wing of Solidarity in Poland (see
country chapters in Taggart/Szczerbiak forth-
coming).
The principal exceptions to these generalisa-
tions are parties that have eschewed the catch-
all strategy, and have more or less retained fo-
cus on the ideology, interest or identity on which
the party was originally based. Norway provides
the two classic examples: the old liberal left
spawned two new parties during the interwar
era, an agrarian party designed to represent
farmers interests and a peripheral Christian
party created to put forward pietist candidates
(Nelsen 1993). Similar parties were established
elsewhere in the Nordic region. Like the North-
ern Irish unionist parties these peripheral par-
ties have perceived the EU as a threat to their
core ideology and values. The Norwegian Cen-
tre party still does, as do the East Central Euro-
pean agrarian parties (Batory/Sitter forthcom-
ing). The Scandinavian Christian parties have
adopted more ambivalent approaches to Euro-
pean integration than their continental counter-
parts, based partly on their dissident origins
(Madeley/Sitter 2003). The same holds for many
post-communist Christian national parties.
However, elsewhere the EU has been seen as
the ally of minorities and regional parties rather
than a threat (De Winter 2001).
Finally, protest parties make fertile ideologi-
cal ground for Euro-scepticism inasmuch as
opposition to the prevailing consensus at the
domestic level may be extended to the EU level.
This is the core of Taggarts touchstone of dis-
sent thesis, which concludes that protest par-
ties may use their position on the EU as one
means of differentiating themselves from the
established parties (1998, 382). Openly nation-
alist parties are obvious candidates for Euro-
scepticism. East Central Europe boasts the key
examples, from Mečiars Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia (Henderson 2001) to Po-
lands League of Polish Families (Szczerbiak
2002), but Austrias Freedom Party (Fallend
2002) and Denmarks Progress and Danish Peo-
ples Parties are important West European cases.
On the left flank, left-socialist parties (Chris-
tensen 1996) and unreformed communists have
opposed European integration as too free-mar-
ket oriented and insufficiently internationalist.
In terms of the origins, ideology and identity
of parties this distinction between mainstream
catch-all parties and their rivals suggests that
there are considerable differences among par-
ties propensities to Euro-scepticism. With a few
significant exceptions, catch-all parties provide
much poorer bases for principled opposition to
European integration, although many feature
Euro-factions. The importance of how dissent
is handled was amply illustrated by the Norwe-
gian Labour Partys 1972 and 1994 referendum
campaigns: the first caused a split while the sec-
ond was more permissive (Saglie 2000). As far
as hard Euro-scepticism is concerned, the pro-
test and interest parties provide more fertile
ground.
4.Party Policy  the Content of
Euro-Scepticism
If a partys identity is the cornerstone of its
approach to European integration, its policies
provide the content of Euro-scepticism. Yet
policy preferences are by nature more contin-
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gent than identity, and may evolve faster than a
partys identity or organisation. Even if a par-
tys policy preferences remain relatively stable,
their correlation with EU policy may change or
alternatives may become obsolete. The policy
content of the box labelled Euro-scepticism
may therefore change with the evolution of party
preferences, domestic policy and/or EU policy.
For the catch-all parties the central question
has been to what extent the EU represents a
move from the domestic status quo in a desir-
able or undesirable direction, particularly with
respect to economic policy. This explains the
propensity of the centre-right and -left parties
to resist or welcome European integration as the
EU shifts between free market orientation and
regulation-oriented integration (Hooghe/Marks/
Wilson 2002). The most prominent examples
are the British Labour Partys conversion from
hard Euro-sceptic to pro-EU in the decade after
the 1983 defeat, and the almost parallel but
milder rise of Euro-scepticism among Conserva-
tive right-wing ranks (Daniels 1998; Garry
1995). The same sometimes holds for foreign
policy. A combination of economic policy, cor-
poratism, neutrality and consensual democracy
shaped Swedens approach to the EU up to 1990
(Miles 1997). Whereas Social Democrat Prime
Minister Erlander aborted the first emergent EU
debate in 1961 by declaring membership incom-
patible with Swedish neutrality, the party re-
versed positions swiftly after the collapse of the
Berlin Wall and adopted a pro-EU stance as early
as October 1990. In post-communist East Cen-
tral Europe the question is complicated by the
underdeveloped nature of the conservative
right (Schopflin 1993). To the extent that par-
ties focus more on collective values than the free
market, they have reasons to question the liber-
alising impact of EU membership. The increas-
ingly populist turn of the liberal Federation of
Young Democrats (Fidesz) in Hungary after its
poor showing in the 1994 elections opened for
a shift to soft Euro-scepticism as the party be-
came increasingly critical of big (international)
business (Batory 2002). However, in the Czech
Republic Klauss Civic Democrats (ODS)
adopted much the same approach as the soft
Euro-sceptic wing of the British Conservatives
(Hanley 1999), criticising the EU from a free
market and Atlanticist perspective.
As far as the parties that compete across the
left vs. right dimension are concerned, core
policy preferences are often the key to Euro-
scepticism. Or so the Euro-sceptic territorial
parties that have turned pro-EU suggest. A com-
bination of pietism, defence of national sover-
eignty and specific concerns such as the EU al-
cohol policy shaped Euro-scepticism in the
Norwegian Christian Peoples Party and the
Finnish Christian League (SKL 1999). How-
ever, the latter has since reversed its position,
partly as a consequence of EU membership
(SKL 2003). Likewise, whereas the Nordic
agrarian parties (except the catch-all Danish
Venstre, Bille 1994) share ideological bases that
are conducive to Euro-scepticism because the
parties represent the periphery against a pro-EU
centre, their differences can be explained in
terms of policy. The Swedish party converted
to a pro-EU stance after the Social Democrats
U-turn, but this was driven by a re-evaluation
of access to the Single Market and the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (Ryden 2000). A simi-
lar process is underway with respect to fisher-
ies policy and the Progressive Party in Iceland.
The reverse process is rarer, but can be found in
the Italian Lega Nords hardening Euro-scepti-
cism in the second half of the 1990s. Its last
Euro-election programme called for a confed-
erate union, advocating communities consti-
tutional right of annulment of the application
of EU law, thus rejecting the continental su-
per-state (Lega Nord 1999).
It is less surprising that the salient policies of
parties that operate on the left and right flanks
tend to conflict with EU policies, inasmuch as
they oppose the mainstream consensus. Left-
socialists and unreconstructed communists
opposition to (capitalist) European integration
partly reflects the EUs focus on market inte-
gration, and other protectionist parties in post-
communist Europe have been drawn toward
similar stances. In the Netherlands the new List
Pim Fortuyn adopted the Euro-sceptic stance of
its leader (Harmsen 2002), but the EU question
has been more problematic for populist anti-tax
parties on the far right in countries for which
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EU membership would entail pressure for lower
taxes and prices. Hence the mixed or even pro-
EU strategies adopted by the Norwegian and
Swedish right-populists, even if they may share
their Danish counterparts suspicions of EMU
as an interventionist project.
In this strategy-oriented model, a partys
longer term propensity for Euro-scepticism is
the product of a combination of its identity and
core policy aims. Catch-all parties are less prone
to ideological opposition to European integra-
tion, but some oppose aspects of it when do-
mestic and EU policy jar. Changing positions
on European integration may therefore be ex-
plained in terms of policy, particularly economic
and foreign policy. However, this is not the case
to the same extent for interest or protest parties,
for which policy preferences and ideology cor-
relate more strongly. Here the motive for party
formation has tended to be protest or opposi-
tion, and EU or domestic policy change is less
significant.
5.The Pursuit of Votes  Electoral
Incentives and Euro-Scepticism
Whereas a partys identity and policy prefer-
ences shape its overall strategic approach to
European integration, its pursuit of votes and
office affects the way this is translated into ac-
tual Euro-scepticism. The classic assumption
that parties seek to maximise votes suggests
convergence on the median voters in a two-party
system, and even a degree of median-voter-cen-
tred policy outcomes in multi-party systems
(Downs 1957). If Euro-scepticism is not a sin-
gle dimension, but is linked to political compe-
tition on existing dimensions, it is unlikely to
be salient or strong at the centre of the party
system. This is not to say that parties or voters
that lie near the median on the left vs. right di-
mension will not oppose European integration,
but merely to suggest that to the extent that they
do, this opposition will be linked to another (ter-
ritorial) dimension. As far as the catch-all par-
ties are concerned, the median voter is pro-EU,
whereas the voters for whom opposition to Eu-
ropean integration is salient are likely to be lo-
cated at the right wings of centre-right parties
and left of the centre-left parties. Although the
catch-all strategy is usually associated with
Downsian competition, some catch-all parties
choose platforms that pull the party towards the
left or right flank rather than the centre in at-
tempts to influence or shape median-voter pref-
erences rather than accommodate them (Dun-
leavy 1991). The British Conservatives and
Forza Italia tried this in 2001, and moved into
a more Euro-sceptic policy space. Conversely,
for the British and German centre-left the deci-
sion to compete close to the centre precluded
Euro-scepticism (Lees 2002).
This dilemma is, if anything, stronger for par-
ties that compete on cross-cutting dimensions
or at the flanks, because they face tradeoffs be-
tween targeting their core constituency and seek-
ing to attract votes from the wider electorate. If
they target a Euro-sceptic constituency in a pro-
EU country, as for example the Swedish Left
party or the Hungarian Independent Smallhold-
ers, this limits their appeal. Moreover, they may
be crowded out if more mainstream parties adopt
Euro-sceptic positions, as has been the case with
the Smallholders and the Hungarian Justice and
Life Party after Fideszs soft Euro-sceptic turn.
Even parties that compete on the flanks of the
party system face a trade-off between maintain-
ing their protest-oriented electoral appeal and
attempting to poach voters from their neigh-
bours. The Austrian Freedom Party, Italian Na-
tional Alliance and the List Pim Fortuyn have
all played down Euro-scepticism during cam-
paigns in competition with their mainstream
centre-right rivals. The Norwegian Progress
Party provides one of the few cases of the op-
posite, as it played down its support for EU
membership.
The first powerful force that might cause par-
ties to modify or soften their Euro-scepticism is
thus the pursuit of votes. However, in most cases
this results in silence on the European question
during electoral campaigns rather than durable
change. It has been easier for small parties with
more clearly delineated target electorates to capi-
talise on opposition to European integration than
for catch-all parties. The parties that have
adopted hard Euro-sceptic platforms or long-
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term soft Euro-scepticism have only persisted
where, as in Norway, Poland and Finland, an
overwhelming share of their core electorate
opposes EU membership. Where the core elec-
torate has changed towards a more pro-EU
stance, whether because interests change (Swed-
ish farmers) or the party outgrows its origins
(the Swedish Christians Democrats), the party
has faced considerable incentives to adopt a pro-
EU position.
6.The Quest for Office  Executive
Constraints on Euro-Scepticism
Even if identity and policy preferences are
conducive to Euro-scepticism and electoral
competition reinforces this, the quest for par-
ticipation in executive office may constrain
party-based Euro-scepticism. If a partys elec-
toral incentives depend on its nearest competi-
tors not having crowded out the Euro-sceptic
space, this means that the partys potential coa-
lition partners are likely to be pro-EU and coa-
lition games are likely to exert a constraining
effect. Because governing parties in EU mem-
ber states tend to be party to EU policy deals
and to defend these (Hix/Lord 1996), executive
office is more likely to constrain Euro-sceptics
than pro-EU parties. This also holds for appli-
cant countries and countries that participate in
aspects of European integration (e.g. the Euro-
pean Economic Area). Conversely, spells in
opposition are usually the consequence of elec-
toral defeat, and defeat tends to render debates
over party strategy more legitimate and salient.
Opposition also makes it difficult to buy off or
discipline internal dissent. Not only do the mod-
erating constraints of office not operate when a
party is in opposition, but Euro-sceptic strands
within the party may be freer to operate.
The moderating effect of office appears to
apply across party systems and party strategies.
The two main British parties have famously
proven more Euro-sceptic during spells of op-
position. Fideszs above-mentioned populist
turn in Hungary was a reassessment in the light
of electoral defeat. Severeal Euro-sceptic par-
ties have softened or abandoned their Euro-scep-
ticism when in office. In Greece, PASOK qui-
etly turned after winning the 1981 election
(Verney 1996). The Italian communists expe-
rience in the 1970s suggests that even aspira-
tion to office may have a similar effect. Perhaps
the most blatant case is that of the Finnish Cen-
tre Party in 1994, when Esko Ahos threat to
resign as party leader and prime minister secured
a sceptical partys support for EU membership
(Rauino 1999). Milder versions can be found in
the constraints placed on Lega Nord in Italy, the
Freedom Party in Austrian and the Polish Peas-
ant Party (PSL). The main exception to this rule
so far has been Norway, where centre-right coa-
litions broke up over European integration in
1971 and 1990 and the current coalition fea-
tures a suicide-clause that precludes raising the
EU question. Together with the Finnish Chris-
tian Leagues departure from the coalition that
took the country into the EU and the recent col-
lapse of coalitions that included the Austrian
Freedom Party, the List Pim Fortuyn and the
Polish Peasant Party, this suggests that not only
does office constrain Euro-scepticism, but fail-
ure to adapt to these constraints severely jeop-
ardises coalitions.
7.Conclusion  Towards a Tamer Shrew?
The model explored above casts Euro-scepti-
cism as a product of party strategy, and herein
lies the clue to the taming of the shrew. A par-
tys decision to adopt or modify a Euro-sceptic
stance is the product of four strategic consid-
erations: the weight of the partys identity and
ideology, the implications of its pursuit of core
policy preferences, the incentives it faces in its
pursuit of votes and the constraints of coalition
politics. In each case, propensities or incentives
for Euro-scepticism may be modified. By con-
trast, few pro-EU parties have moved toward
Euro-scepticism for reasons of vote
maximisation or office. Party identity and or-
ganisation make up the starting point identifi-
cation of the actual or potential shrew. With
the exception of catch-all parties that draw on
explicitly nationalist ideology, the extent to
which catch-all parties provide a fertile base for
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Euro-scepticism depends on their factions. Par-
ties that are rooted in protection on specific in-
terests or in protest are more prone to Euro-scep-
ticism. Policy preferences may both exacerbate
and undermine Euro-scepticism. To the extent
that some catch-all parties have adopted Euro-
sceptic platforms, this has been driven by policy
concerns. This kind of Euro-scepticism is there-
fore soft, or contingent. Given the importance
of policy to the interest or protest parties, there
is more scope for policy reinforcing identity-
based opposition to European integration, to
produce hard Euro-scepticism. However, the
two shorter term dilemmas, how and whether
to maximise votes and how much to compro-
mise in the pursuit of office, exert potentially
softening effects on most parties.
Hard Euro-sceptic parties are therefore likely
to be found at the party systems cross-cutting
dimensions or flanks, in the shape of interest or
protest parties, even if some catch-all parties
accommodate factions that oppose EU member-
ship. The Greek, Finnish and Swedish evidence
suggests that even hard Euro-sceptic parties may
soften their opposition to EU membership once
the country has joined and realistic policy alter-
natives change. Even principled opposition to
European integration is subject to incentives for
modification if policies change, if expansion
beyond the partys core electorate is sought, or
participation in office secured.
Soft Euro-scepticism is more pervasive, and,
by definition, more contingent. However, the
distinction between catch-all parties that adopt
more Euro-sceptic stances in opposition and
protest or issue parties that soften Euro-scepti-
cism remains significant. The former is the most
contingent form of Euro-scepticism. Even when
a catch-all party bases Euro-scepticism on policy
preferences, the pursuit of votes and achieve-
ment of office constrains Euro-scepticism in
practice. Because soft Euro-scepticism is driven
by policy, it is subject to modification if poli-
cies or policy alternatives change. The caveat is
that this depends on the party leaderships in-
terpretation of changes and its ability to carry
the party with it. Here interest parties are gener-
ally less flexible. As long as the interest or pro-
test parties focus on their core identity and es-
chew catch-all strategies they are less likely to
adjust to incentives related to vote maximisation
and access to office. The purer the interest or
protest strategy, the less likely is the effect of
short term incentives.
The key to parties adoption of and changes
in Euro-scepticism therefore lies in party strat-
egy, in the sense of the combined goals that
shape competition between parties: survival of
the party and its core identity, policy preferences,
the pursuit of votes and the quest for office. The
advantage of this model over more parsimoni-
ous cleavage- or policy-oriented models of
party-based Euro-scepticism is that it brings the
party (or more specifically the party leadership)
back in as the central actor. Parties platforms
are shaped by more than their policies, even if
policy-focus explains aspects of changes in
party-based Euro-scepticism. Identity and or-
ganisation provide long term constraints, and
concerns for votes and office shape short term
incentives. Moreover, three broad strategies,
catch-all, interest and protest, are associated with
different priorities and choices as far as these
four goals are concerned. Euro-scepticism is
considered a matter of party strategy and, within
the parameters made up by the domestic party
system, policy alternatives and EU policy, both
its elaboration and change is therefore explained
in terms of actors strategic and tactical choices.
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